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Structural Barriers to Climate Finance Access: The Conditionality Paradox in Indonesia's NDC Commitments

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Abstract

This study is motivated by the growing gap between Indonesia's increasing conditional climate commitments under the Paris Agreement and its limited access to financing from the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It aims to analyse how the structural design of the global climate finance architecture constrains Indonesia's access to GCF funding. The study employs a qualitative document analysis of Indonesia's NDC submissions, GCF project data, and national and international policy reports. The findings reveal a conditionality paradox, where Indonesia's conditional financing needs have increased significantly from USD 247 billion in 2016 to USD 472.6 billion in 2025, while GCF access remains below 0.2% of these needs. These constraints are not solely due to domestic capacity limitations but are also embedded in the complex institutional requirements of the GCF, which have not fully adapted to the bottom-up approach of the Paris Agreement. The implications highlight the need for structural reforms within the GCF alongside strengthened domestic coordination and institutional capacity. The study concludes that the gap between commitments and finance access represents a systemic barrier requiring comprehensive policy responses.

Keywords

Climate Finance, Conditionality Paradox, Green Climate Fund, NDC, Paris Agreement.

1. Introduction

Climate change has become one of the most pressing challenges of the twenty-first century, requiring collective action from both developed and developing countries. Under the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, countries are required to submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) outlining their plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build resilience to climate impacts (UNFCCC, 2023). A key feature of this framework is the distinction between unconditional and conditional targets, where developing countries commit to higher levels of ambition on the condition that they receive international financial support (Pauw et al., 2020). Indonesia, as one of the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters and a country highly vulnerable to climate impacts, has consistently participated in this process by submitting and updating its NDCs since 2016 (Climate Action Tracker, 2025).

Indonesia's climate ambition has grown considerably over the past decade. Starting with a target of 29% unconditional and 41% conditional emission reduction in its First NDC in 2016, Indonesia raised these targets in its enhanced NDC in 2022 to 31.89% unconditional and 43.2% conditional, requiring an estimated USD 285 billion in international financial support to achieve (Republic of Indonesia, 2022). In October 2025, Indonesia submitted its Second Nationally Determined Contribution (SNDC), further raising its climate ambition and expanding the scope of its conditional commitments, with financing needs now estimated at USD 472.6 billion for the 2030–2035 period alone (WRI Indonesia, 2025). However, a closer look at Indonesia's access to international climate finance reveals a troubling gap. Despite submitting increasingly ambitious conditional targets, Indonesia has accessed only USD 576.6 million through 19 Green Climate Fund (GCF) approved projects over a decade, representing less than 0.2% of its stated USD 285 billion conditional climate finance needs (GGGI, 2025).

Several scholars have examined different aspects of this issue. Pauw et al. (2020) highlight a structural gap in the Paris Agreement, where the cost of implementing conditional NDCs exceeds developed countries' climate finance commitments. Garschagen and Doshi (2022) emphasize that institutional capacity is crucial for accessing GCF funding, with many vulnerable countries struggling despite being priority recipients. Sattar (2024) notes that capacity building support for developing countries is often required before effective engagement with climate finance, but is rarely provided in practice. At the national level, Apresian (2025) finds that weak inter-ministerial coordination in Indonesia undermines the quality of funding proposals submitted to international institutions. However, none of these studies specifically analyzes how these challenges affect GCF funding in Indonesia following the submission of the 2025 SNDC.

This study seeks to address that gap by using regime theory by Krasner (1982) as its theoretical framework and the conditionality paradox, based on Pauw et al.'s (2020) findings on the gap between conditional NDCs and climate finance delivery, as its analytical concept. The conditionality paradox describes a situation where the Paris Agreement pushes countries to set higher conditional targets, while the GCF's requirements make those targets harder to fund (Garschagen & Doshi, 2022). This study addresses that gap through a close examination of Indonesia's case, using Indonesia's SNDC as its most current empirical basis.

This study contributes to the literature in two ways. This study adds to the growing literature on climate finance access by examining how the conditionality paradox shapes a major developing country's ability to fund its conditional climate commitments within the existing global climate regime. In practical terms, the findings offer insights for policymakers in Indonesia and other developing countries on how to navigate structural barriers within the GCF system, and for international climate institutions on how their accreditation and proposal requirements may need

to be reformed to better support countries with growing conditional commitments (WRI, 2021; Soanes et al., 2022).

This study seeks to answer how the structural design of the global climate finance architecture constrains Indonesia's access to the Green Climate Fund despite its escalating conditional commitments under the Paris Agreement. To address this question, the study employs a qualitative document analysis approach, drawing on Indonesia's SNDC, GCF project portfolios, accreditation requirements, and policy reports from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance and international climate institutions.

2. Literature Review

2.1. The International Climate Regime and its Structural Design

This study applies regime theory, which defines international regimes as sets of principles, norms, rules, and procedures shaping state behavior in specific issue areas (Krasner, 1982). These regimes often reflect the interests of dominant states, meaning outcomes are not equally beneficial for all members. In climate finance, this explains why the Green Climate Fund creates barriers for developing countries like Indonesia (Draguljić, 2019; Bodansky, 2023). Since the UNFCCC in 1992, the regime has shifted from top-down under the Kyoto Protocol to bottom-up under the Paris Agreement, but finance access rules have lagged.

Within this regime, the rules and procedures governing climate finance access were largely shaped by developed countries and continue to reflect their priorities (Draguljić, 2019). Once these rules are established, they are difficult to change because the countries that benefit from them tend to resist reform. Thompson (2025) argues that developed countries have also actively shaped the regime to serve their own interests, limiting the space for developing countries to influence how climate finance is structured and distributed.

The climate regime also consists of many overlapping institutions, norms, and actors that do not always work in the same direction (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). For developing countries like Indonesia, this means dealing with multiple layers of requirements across different funding mechanisms, which makes accessing international climate finance even harder (Bhandary, 2024). Draguljić (2019) argues that the design of this regime is not neutral, as it reflects the priorities of those who shaped it, and that not all countries benefit equally from it. How this plays out specifically through the GCF and Indonesia's conditional NDC commitments is examined in the following sections.

2.2. The Structural Design of The Global Climate Regime

Building on the structural characteristics of the international climate regime, this section examines how conditionality operates within the NDC framework and its implications for developing countries seeking international climate finance. Under the Paris Agreement, countries submit Nationally Determined Contributions that distinguish between unconditional targets and those dependent on external support. A fundamental tension arises because the aggregate cost of implementing conditional NDCs far exceeds the financial commitments pledged by developed countries (Pauw et al., 2020; Suroso et al., 2022). This imbalance between stated needs and available resources underpins what this study defines as the conditionality paradox. While mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund Readiness Programme aim to support capacity building, they have not sufficiently enabled developing countries to meet stringent institutional requirements for direct access (Bergsvik et al., 2024; Rahman et al., 2024).

In Indonesia's case, despite completing two phases of the GCF Readiness Programme, significant capacity gaps persist, particularly in meeting fiduciary and

technical standards, prompting the development of a third phase (Fiscal Policy Agency & GGGI, 2023). This creates a circular constraint in which countries must demonstrate capacity to access funding, while that same funding is needed to build capacity (Sattar, 2024). Isah et al. (2025) highlight that, more broadly, developing countries have steadily increased their financing needs across successive NDCs without a corresponding increase in confirmed funding sources. Indonesia illustrates this trend clearly, with estimated needs rising from USD 247 billion to USD 285 billion and reaching USD 472.6 billion for 2030–2035, even as access remains limited (WRI Indonesia, 2025). Ongoing debates on post-2025 climate finance targets have similarly failed to close this gap (Pauw et al., 2022; Naiborhu et al., 2024).

2.2. Indonesia Climate Commitments and GCF Access Challenges

The structural and financial barriers discussed earlier are clearly reflected in Indonesia's experience within the global climate finance system. Indonesia's trajectory illustrates a broader pattern in which increasing climate ambition is not matched by improved access to funding. Countries with stronger governance systems and more experienced national entities are more likely to secure project approvals from the Green Climate Fund, regardless of their climate vulnerability (Garschagen & Doshi, 2022). Despite being a major emitter and a priority recipient, Indonesia continues to face institutional capacity challenges in effectively accessing climate finance (Climate Action Tracker, 2025). Soanes et al. (2022) and Apresian (2025) argue that, at the operational level, the absence of clear frameworks for engaging local actors further limits the effectiveness of funding distribution, particularly in complex governance contexts such as Indonesia.

The Country Programme Document highlights three persistent constraints: unbalanced sectoral financing, weak country ownership in a multi-level governance system, and limited private sector engagement (Fiscal Policy Agency & GGGI, 2023). These challenges reflect deeper structural mismatches between GCF requirements and Indonesia's governance arrangements, compounded by legislative barriers and misalignment between climate targets and development planning (Hastuti, 2024). As a result, Indonesia's rising conditional commitments are not matched by improved financial access (Pauw et al., 2020; Garschagen & Doshi, 2022). This study argues that limited GCF access is shaped not only by domestic constraints but also by structural features of the global climate finance architecture, a proposition examined through Indonesia's GCF access record and its 2025 SNDC.

3. Methods

This study uses qualitative document analysis to examine how the structural design of the global climate finance architecture constrains Indonesia's access to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) despite its escalating conditional NDC commitments. This approach is appropriate for two reasons. First, the research question focuses on structural features of an international regime and their effects on a specific country's policy position, which can be better understood through official documents and policy reports than through surveys or interviews. Second, the key documents needed to answer the research question, including Indonesia's NDC submissions, GCF project data, and national climate finance reports, are publicly available and contain enough detail to allow for careful analysis.

Two categories of documents are used in this study. The first is primary sources, which are official documents produced by governments and intergovernmental institutions. These include Indonesia's Second Nationally Determined Contribution submitted to the UNFCCC in October 2025, the Enhanced NDC submitted in 2022, the First NDC submitted in 2016, the GCF Indonesia Country Page, the GCF Readiness Programme reports, and the Country Programme Document developed jointly by Indonesia's Fiscal Policy Agency and GGGI in 2023. The second is

secondary sources, which include reports from the Climate Action Tracker, WRI Indonesia, and GGGI, as well as peer-reviewed journal articles found through searches of Google Scholar and Scopus.

Documents used in this study fall into two categories. The first is relevance, meaning the document must directly address Indonesia's climate commitments, GCF access, or the global climate finance architecture. The second is authority, meaning the document must come from a recognized governmental, intergovernmental, or research institution. The third is recency, with preference given to documents published between 2020 and 2025, while older documents were included where they provide important background for the theoretical framework.

The analysis follows three steps. The first is document coding, where each document was read in full and organised around three themes. The first theme is conditional climate commitments, which covers Indonesia's NDC targets and financing needs across successive submissions. The second theme is GCF access record, which covers approved projects, funding amounts, and how much of Indonesia's stated financing needs have actually been met. The third theme is structural barriers, which covers GCF requirements, capacity gaps, and governance challenges. The second step is thematic synthesis, where findings across documents were compared within each theme to identify what they have in common and where they differ. Where documents gave conflicting information, the most recent and authoritative source was used. The third step is interpretation, where the findings were read against the conditionality paradox framework, drawing on Pauw et al. (2020) and Sattar (2024), to assess how the structural design of the global climate finance architecture affects Indonesia's ability to access GCF funding in line with its conditional commitments.

4. Results

4.1. Indonesia Escalating Conditional NDC Commitments (2015–2025)

Indonesia has submitted three climate commitments to the UNFCCC since 2016, with each submission setting higher targets and requiring more international financial support than the previous one. The First NDC, submitted in 2016, set an unconditional emission reduction target of 29% and a conditional target of 41% against a 2010 business-as-usual baseline, with an estimated financing need of USD 247 billion for the period 2018 to 2030 (Republic of Indonesia, 2016). The Enhanced NDC, submitted in 2022, raised these targets to 31.89% unconditional and 43.2% conditional, with financing needs increasing to USD 285 billion for the same period (Republic of Indonesia, 2022). Indonesia's SNDC, submitted in October 2025, marked a further shift in approach. Rather than using percentage-based reduction targets against a business-as-usual baseline, the SNDC introduced absolute emission targets for 2035 using 2019 as the reference year. Its conditional scenarios, known as the Low Carbon Compatible with Paris Agreement pathways, project emissions of 1,488 MtCO₂e and 1,257 MtCO₂e by 2035 under low and high economic growth assumptions, respectively, both of which depend on receiving international financial support estimated at USD 472.6 billion for the 2030 to 2035 period alone (WRI Indonesia, 2025).

Table 1. Comparison of Indonesia's NDCs and Financing Needs (2016–2025)

Document	Year	Unconditional Target	Conditional Target	Estimated Financing Need
First NDC	2016	29% reduction from BAU 2010	41% reduction from BAU 2010	USD 247 billion (2018–2030)
Enhanced NDC	2022	31.89% reduction from BAU 2010	43.2% reduction from BAU 2010	USD 285 billion (2018–2030)

Document	Year	Unconditional Target	Conditional Target	Estimated Financing Need
SNDC	2025	CPOS scenario (absolute, 2019 baseline)	LCCP-L and LCCP-H scenarios (absolute, 2019 baseline)	USD 472.6 billion (2030–2035)

Table 1 illustrates the evolution of Indonesia’s climate commitments under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) framework of the Paris Agreement from 2016 to 2025. It shows a clear upward trajectory in both mitigation ambition and estimated financing needs. In its First NDC in 2016, Indonesia set an unconditional emission reduction target of 29% and a conditional target of 41% relative to the 2010 Business-As-Usual (BAU) baseline, with an estimated financing requirement of USD 247 billion for the 2018–2030 period. These targets were subsequently increased in the enhanced NDC in 2022 to 31.89% (unconditional) and 43.2% (conditional), alongside a higher estimated financing need of USD 285 billion for the same period (Garschagen & Doshi, 2022).

A more significant shift is observed in the Second NDC (SNDC) submitted in 2025, where Indonesia moved from percentage-based reduction targets to absolute emission targets using 2019 as the baseline year. The unconditional target is represented by the CPOS scenario, while the conditional targets are reflected in the LCCP-L and LCCP-H scenarios, both of which are explicitly dependent on international financial support. The estimated financing requirement increases substantially to USD 472.6 billion for the 2030–2035 period alone. The table demonstrates that as Indonesia’s climate ambition increases, so does its reliance on international climate finance (Pauw et al., 2020).

4.2. Structural Barriers in the Green Climate Fund Access Mechanism

While Indonesia’s conditional financing needs have grown substantially, its ability to access Green Climate Fund (GCF) funding has been constrained by several structural features of the GCF’s operating framework. Two aspects of this constraint are worth examining. The first is what the GCF requires from countries seeking funding. The second is how well Indonesia is currently able to meet those requirements (GCF, 2025). Accessing GCF funding involves a multi-step process that requires countries to meet a range of institutional, technical, and financial standards. Countries must work through Accredited Entities, which are institutions that have passed a rigorous accreditation process demonstrating that they meet the GCF’s fiduciary, environmental, and social standards.

For developing countries seeking to use their own national institutions rather than international intermediaries, this means building and maintaining Direct Access Entities that can meet these standards independently. The accreditation process has historically taken an average of 30 months, though GCF has committed to reducing this to 9 months under its 2024 to 2027 reform agenda (GCF, 2024). Beyond accreditation, countries must also submit high-quality funding proposals that meet the GCF’s technical and financial standards, maintain credible monitoring and reporting systems, and demonstrate sound financial management practices throughout project implementation (Soanes et al., 2022; Garschagen & Doshi, 2022).

Indonesia still faces significant capacity gaps, even after years of effort to improve its readiness. Indonesia currently has six nationally accredited Direct Access Entities, including BPD LH, PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur, PT Indonesia Infrastructure Finance, Kemitraan, Yayasan Kehati, and Yayasan Penabulu. However, the majority of GCF funding received by Indonesia has been channelled through international intermediaries such as UNDP and ADB rather than through these national entities, showing that their ability to independently develop and manage GCF projects is still limited (GCF, 2025).

The Country Programme Document developed by Indonesia's Fiscal Policy Agency and GGGI acknowledges three persistent gaps, namely unbalanced financing across priority sectors, weak country ownership within a complex multi-level governance setting, and insufficient private sector engagement. Indonesia has gone through two phases of the GCF Readiness Programme, which is a capacity-building programme designed to help countries meet GCF standards and develop fundable project proposals. After completing these two phases, the government acknowledged that important gaps remained, particularly in meeting the financial management and technical standards that the GCF requires from accredited entities. This gap was significant enough that a third readiness phase was developed to address what the first two phases had not fully resolved (Fiscal Policy Agency & GGGI, 2023). At the governance level, coordination between key ministries responsible for climate finance remains weak, making it harder for Indonesia to present coherent and high-quality funding proposals to the GCF (Apresian, 2025).

4.3. The Conditionality Paradox: Ambition without Proportional Access

Indonesia's conditional financing needs have grown from USD 247 billion in 2016 to USD 472.6 billion in 2025, almost doubling the international support Indonesia has declared it needs to meet its climate targets. Yet over the same period, Indonesia has accessed only USD 576.6 million through 19 GCF projects, representing less than 0.2% of the financing need stated in the ENDC 2022 alone (GGGI, 2025). This gap is not simply a funding shortfall. It reflects a gap between what the Paris Agreement encourages countries to commit to and what the GCF actually makes available to them.

The Paris Agreement's conditional NDC mechanism works by encouraging countries to declare higher ambition in exchange for the promise of international support. Each time Indonesia raised its conditional targets, from 41% in 2016 to 43.2% in 2022 and to the LCCP scenarios in the SNDC 2025, it was committing to targets that could only be achieved with more international financial support (Republic of Indonesia, 2022; WRI Indonesia, 2025). However, the GCF does not automatically increase funding in response to higher conditional commitments. Instead, it requires countries to demonstrate institutional readiness through a rigorous accreditation process, high-quality project proposals, and strong financial management systems before funding can be released at scale (Garschagen & Doshi, 2022; Soanes et al., 2022). As Indonesia's conditional targets grow more ambitious, the funding it needs grows too, but its ability to access that funding has not kept up.

The core of the paradox can be seen here. Building the institutional capacity needed to meet GCF requirements takes time and resources. Indonesia has been working on this through three phases of the GCF Readiness Program, yet the government itself acknowledges that significant capacity gaps remain (Fiscal Policy Agency & GGGI, 2023). The resources needed to close these gaps are, in large part, the same resources that the GCF is designed to provide. In other words, Indonesia needs GCF funding to build the capacity to access GCF funding. The REDD+ programme, worth USD 103.8 million, shows this clearly. Despite being Indonesia's largest single GCF project, it was channelled through UNDP rather than a national Direct Access Entity (UNDP, 2023). When funding goes through international intermediaries, it does not help Indonesia build the national capacity it needs to access GCF funding on its own in the future.

The submission of the SNDC in October 2025 makes this problem harder to resolve and adds a new dimension to the conditionality paradox. The SNDC represents a significant methodological shift from previous NDCs. By moving away from percentage-based reduction targets to absolute emission targets for 2035 and introducing the LCCP scenarios, Indonesia has expanded the scope and scale of its conditional commitments in a way that is more directly tied to receiving international financial support than ever before (WRI Indonesia, 2025).

Under the LCCP scenarios, achieving Indonesia's climate targets is explicitly described as contingent on securing international funding, with financing needs now estimated at USD 472.6 billion for the 2030 to 2035 period alone. This is nearly double the USD 285 billion stated in the ENDC 2022, and it comes at a time when Indonesia's GCF access record has shown little improvement in proportional terms. The SNDC's targets, however, depend on a level of international financial support that the GCF has not been able to provide to Indonesia so far. Climate Action Tracker (2025) notes that achieving Indonesia's conditional targets depends on steep emissions reductions that are unlikely to occur without credible policies, full implementation, and substantial international financial support. This shows that the conditionality paradox is not a theoretical concern but a real barrier to Indonesia's ability to meet its own climate goals.

5. Discussion

The findings of this study show how the tension identified by Pauw et al. (2020) between conditional NDC commitments and climate finance delivery works in practice for a single country. Indonesia's conditional financing needs have grown from USD 247 billion in 2016 to USD 472.6 billion in 2025, yet its GCF access has remained at less than 0.2% of those needs. This pattern confirms what Pauw et al. (2022) described at the global level and shows that the problem has not improved with successive NDC submissions. Sattar (2024) argued that capacity building support should come before climate finance access, but the evidence from Indonesia's three phases of GCF Readiness support shows that even sustained capacity building efforts have not been enough to close the gap between what Indonesia needs and what it can access on its own.

The findings also build on Garschagen and Doshi (2022), who showed that institutional capacity is the primary factor determining GCF access. Indonesia's case confirms this but adds something important. Indonesia has six nationally accredited Direct Access Entities, yet the majority of GCF funding it has received has still gone through international intermediaries such as UNDP and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This shows that having accredited entities is not enough on its own. Those entities also need the practical capacity to develop and manage GCF projects independently, which takes time and resources that many developing countries do not yet have. Apresian (2025) highlights weak inter-ministerial coordination in Indonesia, and this study shows that it interacts with GCF structural barriers, jointly further limiting funding access.

The pattern observed in Indonesia is not unique. Bangladesh, for example, requires an average of USD 20 billion per year in climate finance from 2020 to 2030, yet received only USD 710 million from international sources between 2010 and 2024 (TIB, 2024). Of the countries receiving GCF financing, 97.7% have their projects implemented through international organisations rather than national entities, a pattern that mirrors what this study found in Indonesia. More broadly, studies of other developing countries show similar dynamics, where the GCF's institutional requirements create barriers that are particularly difficult to overcome for countries with limited national capacity (Soanes et al., 2022; Westoby et al., 2024). What makes Indonesia's case notable is that it is a large middle-income country with a relatively developed institutional framework, yet it still faces these barriers. This suggests that the conditionality paradox is not limited to the least developed countries but affects a wider range of developing countries that sit between the extremes of the global climate finance architecture.

A potential objection is that Indonesia has already accessed GCF funding, with 19 approved projects totaling USD 576.6 million, which may appear to challenge the argument that significant barriers exist. However, when compared to Indonesia's financing needs, this amount remains extremely limited. It represents less than 0.2%

of the USD 285 billion required in the ENDC 2022, and is far below the updated USD 472.6 billion needed for the 2030–2035 period under the SNDC 2025. Moreover, the structure of this access reinforces rather than refutes the paradox. Much of Indonesia's GCF funding is channeled through international intermediaries instead of national implementing entities, limiting domestic capacity-building effects. As Soanes et al. (2022) and Westoby et al. (2024) suggest, such arrangements may secure funding but do not substantially strengthen a country's ability to independently access future finance. Therefore, the issue is not access per se, but the adequacy and nature of that access relative to Indonesia's conditional climate commitments.

From a theoretical perspective, this study demonstrates that regime theory helps explain the conditionality paradox by highlighting how the institutional design of the Green Climate Fund reflects enduring norms and rules that have not fully adapted to the bottom-up approach of the Paris Agreement. This structural continuity constrains countries such as Indonesia from accessing finance at a scale proportional to their conditional commitments, even as domestic capacity improves. The findings also carry broader implications for other developing countries facing similar barriers. Addressing this gap requires both systemic reform within the GCF and strengthened domestic coordination to enable more effective and independent access to international climate finance.

6. Conclusion

The findings of this study show that Indonesia's increasing conditional commitments under the Paris Agreement have not been matched by proportional access to financing from the Green Climate Fund. This gap reflects a conditionality paradox in which countries are encouraged to raise climate ambition in exchange for international support, yet face stringent institutional requirements that constrain their ability to access such funding. The results indicate that these barriers are not solely rooted in domestic institutional weaknesses but are also embedded in the structural design of the global climate finance architecture. The implications point to the need for more fundamental reforms within the GCF to make its mechanisms more accessible and responsive to developing country contexts, alongside strengthened domestic coordination and institutional capacity to enable more effective and independent access to climate finance.

This study has several limitations. First, its reliance on document-based analysis limits the ability to capture the practical dynamics involved in project preparation and implementation. Second, the single-country focus restricts the generalizability of the findings to other contexts. Third, the 2025 SNDC remains relatively recent, and its full implications for Indonesia's access to climate finance have yet to be observed. Future research should therefore incorporate empirical approaches such as stakeholder interviews, expand comparative analyses across multiple countries, and examine the longer-term impacts of SNDC implementation. Such efforts are essential to deepen understanding of how the gap between climate commitments and finance access can be more effectively addressed.

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Ethical approval was obtained for this study. The manuscript represents original work and has not been previously published, nor is it under consideration by another journal.

Data Disclosure Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.



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