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Analysis of the Effects of Public Ownership, CSR, and Firm Size on Earnings Management

Refina Dwiki Wahono^{1*}

¹ Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia

* Corresponding author: Refina Dwiki Wahono (refina.dwiki.wahono-2022@feb.unair.ac.id)

Abstract

Earnings management remains an important financial reporting issue because information asymmetry and conflicts of interest may encourage management to influence reported earnings, particularly in state-owned enterprises with public accountability. This study examines the effects of public ownership, corporate social responsibility, and firm size on earnings management among SOEs listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2020–2023. Using a quantitative associative design, the study analyzes secondary data from annual reports, sustainability reports, and financial statements selected through purposive sampling. Multiple linear regression was employed using SPSS after classical assumption tests. The results show that public ownership does not significantly affect earnings management, whereas CSR has a significant negative effect. Firm size has a significant positive effect on earnings management. Simultaneously, public ownership, CSR, and firm size significantly affect earnings management. These findings indicate that CSR can support efforts to constrain earnings management, while larger firm size may increase managerial opportunities or pressures to manage reported earnings. The study implies that SOEs should strengthen CSR transparency, financial reporting oversight, and governance mechanisms to improve reporting quality and limit opportunistic behavior.

Keywords

Corporate Social Responsibility, Earning Management, Firm Size, Public Ownership.

1. Introduction

Financial statements serve as a vital source of information for investors, the government, and the public to assess a company's financial condition (Githaiga et al., 2022). A key component of financial statements is the income statement, which presents information regarding a company's revenues, expenses, and profits over a specific period (Putri & Naibaho, 2022). Profit information is often used as a primary indicator of corporate performance and serves as a basis for stakeholder decision-making (Fiqriansyah et al., 2024). However, the importance of reported earnings can incentivize management to influence financial information when managerial interests differ from those of shareholders.

Such conditions are closely related to agency conflicts and information asymmetry between company owners (principals) and management (agents) (Darmayanti et al., 2021; Martias, 2023). Management generally has greater access to internal information and greater discretion over accounting policies, creating opportunities to influence reported earnings through earnings management. Earnings management refers to the practice of influencing reported profit figures by utilizing the flexibility inherent in accounting standards and policies to achieve particular objectives (Dechow et al., 1995; Nguyen et al., 2024). Because profit is commonly used to assess corporate performance and make economic decisions, management may be incentivized to manage reported earnings (Widanengsih et al., 2022). Although earnings management does not necessarily violate accounting standards, excessive or opportunistic practices may reduce the reliability of financial information and potentially precede fraudulent financial reporting.

This issue has occurred in various countries, as illustrated by the Enron Corporation case, in which mark-to-market accounting and aggressive accounting policies were used to inflate reported profits before the case escalated into financial reporting fraud (Scott, 2015). In Indonesia, concerns about financial reporting quality are also evident in the case of PT Indofarma Tbk, a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE). In its Investigative Audit Report covering 2020–2023, the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/BPK*) identified indications of financial irregularities involving potential state losses of IDR 371.8 billion, including inventory inflation, fabricated transactions, and fictitious record-keeping (BPK, 2024). These irregularities caused the company's financial statements to fail to accurately represent its actual condition. The case demonstrates that financial reporting manipulation remains a critical issue, particularly for SOEs that carry substantial responsibilities toward the government, investors, and the public.

From an agency theory perspective by Eisenhardt (1989), earnings management arises from conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between management and shareholders, while corporate governance and firm characteristics may influence managerial opportunities and incentives. Public ownership is expected to strengthen external monitoring and reduce earnings management (Tsaqif & Agustiningsih, 2021). CSR disclosure may constrain opportunistic behavior by enhancing accountability, transparency, and ethical commitment (Kuo et al., 2021a). Meanwhile, firm size may affect earnings management through monitoring, internal controls, operational complexity, and performance pressure (Habibie & Parasetya, 2022). However, previous findings remain inconsistent. Public ownership has also been found to have no significant effect, whereas its monitoring role has been emphasized in other research (Utami et al., 2021). CSR generally shows a negative relationship with earnings management, while findings on firm size vary, with some studies emphasizing monitoring benefits and others reporting a positive relationship with earnings management (Hunjra et al., 2020; Cinthya et al., 2022). These inconsistencies warrant further investigation, particularly among SOEs, where government control, public accountability, and capital market participation coexist.

This study examines the effects of public ownership, CSR, and firm size on earnings management among SOEs listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2020–2023. The study offers a focused examination of these three factors in the SOE context and uses the Modified Jones Model, based on discretionary accruals, to measure accrual-based earnings management. This approach provides a specific empirical perspective on earnings management during a period that includes the years of the Indofarma financial reporting case and allows the proposed relationships to be examined using comparable financial and corporate disclosure information across SOEs. The findings are expected to contribute to the development of earnings management literature and provide a basis for strengthening corporate governance and financial reporting practices in SOEs.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

2.1. The Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Earnings Management

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reflects a company's commitment to conducting business activities ethically while considering social, economic, and environmental impacts to create long-term value for stakeholders (Hunjra et al., 2020; Maheshwari et al., 2024; Azzahra et al., 2024). CSR disclosure represents an important form of corporate accountability because it communicates information regarding the company's social and environmental impacts to stakeholders (Supardi & Setyapurnama, 2020). Companies with higher levels of CSR disclosure tend to demonstrate greater concern for transparency, ethical conduct, and stakeholder interests. Such characteristics may discourage management from engaging in earnings management because manipulation of financial information can undermine corporate credibility and damage stakeholder trust. Kuo et al. (2021a) indicate that companies committed to CSR tend to emphasize responsible business practices and transparency, which can reduce the likelihood in earnings management.

Agency theory provides a basis for understanding the relationship between CSR and earnings management. Agency conflicts occur when management's interests differ from those of shareholders, particularly when information asymmetry provides management with opportunities to pursue personal interests (Hoesada, 2020). CSR disclosure can function as an accountability and transparency mechanism that reduces information asymmetry and strengthens stakeholder monitoring. By providing broader information about corporate activities, CSR disclosure may limit management's ability to engage in opportunistic behavior. In addition, management may avoid earnings management because such practices can conflict with the ethical and responsible image communicated through CSR activities. Kuo et al. (2021b) and Tran et al. (2022) support a negative relationship between CSR and earnings management, while Hunjra et al. (2020) also indicate that CSR-related practices can reduce opportunistic managerial behavior.

H1: Corporate social responsibility has a negative effect on earnings management.

2.2. The Effect of Public Ownership on Earnings Management

Public ownership refers to the proportion of a company's shares held by the public, excluding management and controlling shareholders (Delima & Herawaty, 2020). A higher proportion of public ownership can strengthen external monitoring because public shareholders have an interest in the quality and transparency of corporate information (Givoly et al., 2010; Gaio & Pinto, 2018). As the number of external shareholders increases, management faces greater scrutiny regarding its decisions and financial reporting practices. This condition may encourage management to act more transparently and reduce the opportunity to engage in

earnings management. Utami et al. (2021) argue that public ownership can strengthen oversight of management activities because public shareholders have an interest in ensuring that corporate information accurately reflects the company's actual condition. Therefore, greater public ownership is expected to strengthen external monitoring and constrain opportunistic managerial behavior.

From the perspective of agency theory, public ownership can serve as an external monitoring mechanism that reduces agency conflicts between shareholders as principals and management as agents. Agency conflicts arise because management may pursue its own interests and possess greater information than shareholders (Hoesada, 2020). Greater public ownership can increase monitoring pressure and encourage management to be more accountable in preparing financial reports, thereby reducing opportunities for earnings management (Capalbo et al., 2018; Ruggiero et al., 2022). When management faces stronger external oversight, the scope for opportunistic actions becomes more limited. Accordingly, companies with higher levels of public ownership are expected to have lower levels of earnings management. This argument is consistent with the view that stronger shareholder monitoring can mitigate agency problems and discourage managerial actions that may harm shareholders' interests.

H2: Public ownership has a negative effect on earnings management.

2.3. The Effect of Firm Size on Earnings Management

Firm size reflects the scale of a company and is commonly measured by total assets (Cinthya et al., 2022). Large firms generally have more extensive organizational structures, stronger internal control systems, and greater levels of external oversight. Their operations also attract greater attention from investors, creditors, regulators, and the public, which can encourage management to maintain transparency and accountability in financial reporting. Habibie and Parasetya (2022) argue that the stronger internal controls and greater external scrutiny associated with large firms can reduce opportunities for earnings management. In addition, large firms have reputations and stakeholder relationships to maintain, creating incentives for management to avoid actions that could damage corporate credibility. Therefore, firm size may strengthen the monitoring environment and constrain opportunistic managerial behavior.

From the perspective of agency theory, larger firms may face greater monitoring from shareholders and other stakeholders because their operations and financial activities have broader economic implications. Stronger monitoring can reduce information asymmetry and limit management's opportunity to act in its own interests (Hoesada, 2020). Moreover, the greater visibility of large firms may increase the reputational consequences associated with financial reporting manipulation. Management therefore has incentives to maintain the reliability of financial information and avoid earnings management practices that could undermine stakeholder confidence. Although large firms may face greater performance pressure, the stronger monitoring and control mechanisms associated with their size are expected to discourage opportunistic behavior. This argument is consistent with Habibie and Parasetya (2022), who emphasize the role of internal control and external oversight in limiting earnings management. Thus, based on agency theory and the existing literature, larger firms are expected to exhibit lower levels of earnings management.

H3: Firm size has a negative effect on earnings management.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework illustrating the proposed relationships among CSR, public ownership, firm size, and earnings management. The framework positions CSR, public ownership, and firm size as independent variables, while earnings management serves as the dependent variable. Specifically, H1 proposes that stronger corporate social responsibility practices reduce earnings management, reflecting greater transparency and accountability. H2 predicts a negative relationship between public ownership and earnings management, as broader public monitoring may constrain opportunistic reporting practices. Meanwhile, H3 assumes that larger firms engage in less earnings management because of greater scrutiny and stronger governance mechanisms.

3. Methods

This study employs a quantitative approach using an associative research design to examine the effects of public ownership, CSR, and firm size on earnings management among SOEs listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2020–2023 period. A quantitative approach was appropriate because the study examines relationships among variables using statistical analysis of numerical data from corporate reports. The associative design is used to identify and assess the relationships between the independent variables, namely public ownership, CSR, and firm size, and the dependent variable, namely earnings management.

The study uses secondary data obtained from annual reports, sustainability reports, and financial statements published by SOEs through the official IDX website and the respective companies' official websites. The data collected include public ownership, CSR disclosure, firm size, and financial information needed to measure earnings management. The use of secondary data enables the study to obtain standardized and publicly available information that can be compared across companies and years within the observation period.

The population comprises all SOEs listed on the IDX during 2020–2023. The sample was selected using purposive sampling, which involves choosing observations based on criteria relevant to the research objectives. The criteria include SOEs that were continuously listed on the IDX throughout the 2020–2023 observation period, did not experience delisting or suspension during the study period, published complete annual reports and financial statements for the required years, and provided complete information necessary to measure all research variables, including public ownership, CSR, firm size, and earnings management. Companies that did not meet these criteria were excluded from the sample.

The data were analyzed using multiple linear regression to examine the effects of public ownership, CSR, and firm size on earnings management. Data processing was conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Before hypothesis testing, descriptive statistics were used to describe the characteristics of

the research data. Classical assumption tests were subsequently conducted, including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation tests, to assess whether the regression model met the required assumptions. Hypothesis testing was then conducted using the coefficient of determination (R^2), the simultaneous significance test (F-test), and the partial significance test (t-test). The coefficient of determination was used to assess the explanatory power of the independent variables, while the F-test and t-test were used to evaluate the simultaneous and partial effects of public ownership, CSR, and firm size on earnings management.

4. Results

The results section begins with descriptive statistics to provide an overview of the distribution and characteristics of the variables examined in the study. The analysis covers earnings management as the dependent variable, public ownership, CSR, and firm size as independent variables. The minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation describe variation across the sample and provide an initial understanding of each variable's characteristics.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Earning Management	-9.29	21.19	-0.1078	4.02916
Public Ownership	0.06	0.67	0.3221	0.14369
CSR	0.00	0.93	0.4061	0.24123
Firm Size	27.36	32.66	30.9271	1.22582

Table 1 shows that earnings management has a minimum value of -9.29 and a maximum of 21.19, with a mean of -0.1078 and a standard deviation of 4.02916, indicating considerable variation in earnings management across firms. Public ownership ranges from 0.06 to 0.67, with a mean of 0.3221 and a standard deviation of 0.14369, suggesting that public ownership accounts for approximately 32.21% on average. CSR scores range from 0.00 to 0.93, with a mean of 0.4061 and a standard deviation of 0.24123, indicating variation in CSR disclosure among the observed firms. Meanwhile, firm size ranges from 27.36 to 32.66, with a mean of 30.9271 and a standard deviation of 1.22582, showing relatively lower dispersion compared with the other variables.

Before conducting the hypothesis testing, the regression model was first examined through the classical assumption tests to ensure that the data met the requirements for multiple linear regression analysis. The normality test was conducted using the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the unstandardized residuals. The results of the normality test are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Normality Test

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test	Unstandardized Residual
N	76
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	0.001
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed)	0.078

The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in Table 2 produces two different significance values. The Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) value of 0.001 (< 0.05) would indicate that the residuals are not normally distributed if used as the basis for the decision. However, the asymptotic significance is based on a large-sample distributional approximation, which may be less accurate for relatively small samples or asymmetric data distributions. Therefore, the decision is based on the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) value, which estimates the exact probability through repeated

sampling simulations (10,000 samples with a 99% confidence level), making it more reliable for the 76 observations. Since the Monte Carlo Sig. value of 0.078 exceeds 0.05, the normality assumption is satisfied.

Table 3. Multicollinearity Test Result

Variable	Tolerance	VIF
Public Ownership	0.910	1.099
CSR	1.000	1.000
Firm Size	0.910	1.099

The multicollinearity test aims to determine whether the independent variables in the regression model are highly correlated. A good regression model should be free from multicollinearity. The test was conducted by examining the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. A model is considered free from multicollinearity when the Tolerance value is greater than 0.10 and the VIF value is below 10 (Ghozali, 2021). Based on Table 2, all independent variables have Tolerance values above 0.10 (0.910, 1.000, and 0.910) and VIF values below 10 (1.099, 1.000, and 1.099). Thus, the regression model shows no multicollinearity among the independent variables.

The heteroscedasticity test examines whether the variance of residuals differs across observations in the regression model. A good regression model should be homoscedastic, meaning that the residual variance remains constant. The test was performed by examining a scatterplot of the standardized predicted values on the X-axis and residuals on the Y-axis. Heteroscedasticity is considered absent when the points are randomly distributed above and below zero on the Y-axis without forming a specific pattern, such as a wave-like, widening, or narrowing pattern (Ghozali, 2021).




Figure 2. Heteroscedasticity Test Result (Scatterplot)

Based on Figure 2, the points are randomly distributed above and below zero on the Y-axis and do not form any clear pattern. This finding is further supported by the Spearman Rank Correlation test between the absolute residuals and predicted values, which produces a coefficient of 0.022 with a significance value of 0.852 (> 0.05). Thus, there is no significant relationship between the magnitude of the residuals and the predicted values. One observation has a standardized residual of approximately 4.96, which falls outside the ± 3 range and indicates a potential outlier; however, it does not create any systematic pattern in the distribution. Therefore, the

regression model shows no indication of heteroscedasticity, and the homoscedasticity assumption is satisfied.

The autocorrelation test aims to determine whether there is a correlation between the residuals in period t and those in the previous period ($t-1$) within the regression model. A good regression model should be free from autocorrelation. The test uses the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, which is compared with the lower bound (dL) and upper bound (dU) values from the Durbin-Watson table at a 5% significance level, with 76 observations (n) and three independent variables ($k = 3$). The dL and dU values are obtained by interpolating the Durbin-Watson table for $n = 75$ and $n = 80$. The decision criteria are as follows: (1) no autocorrelation occurs when $dU < DW < 4 - dU$; (2) positive autocorrelation occurs when $DW < dL$; (3) negative autocorrelation occurs when $DW > 4 - dL$; and (4) the test result is inconclusive when DW falls between dL and dU or between $4 - dU$ and $4 - dL$ (Ghozali, 2021).

Table 4. Autocorrelation Test Result (Durbin-Watson)

Test	Value
Durbin-Watson	0.825
dL	1.546
dU	1.710
$4-dU$	2.290
$4-dL$	2.454

Based on Table 3, the Durbin-Watson value of 0.825 is lower than the lower bound ($dL = 1.546$), indicating the presence of positive autocorrelation in the regression model. This condition suggests that the residuals from one observation tend to be correlated with those from the preceding observation, which may occur because the research data combine time-series and cross-sectional observations from 2020–2023. Based on the classical assumption tests, the regression model satisfies the assumptions of normality, absence of multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity, but does not yet satisfy the assumption of no autocorrelation.

Table 5. F Test and Coefficient Determination

Model	Value
F-Statistics	6.397
Sig.	<0.001
R	0.459
R-square	0.210
Adjusted R-square	0.178

Based on Table 4, the results of the F-test yield a significance value of <0.001, which is below the 0.05 significance level. This finding indicates that public ownership, corporate social responsibility, and firm size simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings management. Therefore, the regression model is statistically significant and can be used to examine the relationship between the independent variables and earnings management.

The R value of 0.459 indicates a moderate relationship between public ownership, corporate social responsibility, firm size, and earnings management. The R-squared value of 0.210 indicates that the three independent variables jointly explain 21.0% of the variation in earnings management, while the remaining 79.0% is explained by other factors not included in the model. The Adjusted R Square of 0.178 indicates that after adjusting for the number of predictors in the model, the explanatory power decreases to 17.8%. Thus, the model provides a limited explanation of variations in earnings management.

Table 6. Multiple Linear Regression

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistics	Sig.
Constant	-31.416	-2.873	0.005
Public Ownership → Earnings Management	2.960	0.961	0.340
Corporate Social Responsibility → Earnings Management	-4.700	-2.687	0.009
Firm Size → Earnings Management	1.043	2.891	0.005

Table 6 presents the results of the multiple linear regression analysis examining the effects of public ownership, CSR, and firm size on earnings management. The constant coefficient is -31.416 with a significance value of 0.005, indicating that the constant is statistically significant. Public ownership has a positive coefficient of 2.960, but its significance value of 0.340 exceeds 0.05. Thus, public ownership does not have a statistically significant effect on earnings management. Although the coefficient indicates a positive relationship, the effect is not statistically supported. CSR has a coefficient of -4.700 with a t-value of -2.687 and a significance value of 0.009, indicating a significant negative effect on earnings management. This finding suggests that higher CSR is associated with lower earnings management. Firm size also has a positive coefficient of 1.043, with a t-value of 2.891 and a significance value of 0.005. Since the significance value is below 0.05, firm size has a statistically significant positive effect on earnings management. Thus, the results indicate that CSR and firm size significantly affect earnings management, whereas public ownership does not.

5. Discussion

Based on the regression analysis, the test of the first hypothesis indicates that public ownership does not have a significant effect on earnings management. This finding suggests that the proportion of shares held by the public is insufficient to influence earnings management practices in SOEs. In other words, the presence of public shareholders has not proven strong enough to either restrain or encourage management's decisions regarding earnings management. This situation may occur because public ownership in SOEs tends to be dispersed in relatively small proportions, limiting public shareholders' ability to effectively monitor management policies. Moreover, the ownership structure of SOEs remains dominated by the government, which remains the controlling shareholder in SOEs, reducing the influence of public shareholders on corporate decision-making (Utami et al., 2021). From an agency theory perspective, public ownership is expected to mitigate agency conflicts by strengthening managerial oversight. However, the findings indicate that the monitoring mechanism provided by public shareholders has not functioned effectively enough to constrain earnings management. Therefore, public ownership has not yet served as an effective corporate governance mechanism for limiting opportunistic managerial behavior. This finding is consistent with Delima and Herawaty (2020), who found that public ownership does not significantly influence earnings management. Thus, an increase in the proportion of publicly held shares does not necessarily result in more effective oversight of corporate management.

The test of the second hypothesis reveals that CSR has a significant negative effect on earnings management. This finding indicates that higher levels of CSR disclosure are associated with lower levels of earnings management. The negative relationship suggests that companies with a stronger commitment to social and environmental responsibility tend to place greater emphasis on transparency, accountability, and ethical business practices. Companies that actively disclose CSR activities generally seek to protect their reputation and maintain stakeholder trust, encouraging management to exercise greater caution in financial reporting and avoid earnings manipulation (Kuo et al., 2021a). From an agency theory perspective,

CSR disclosure can reduce conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. Through more extensive CSR disclosure, companies provide greater transparency to stakeholders, thereby reducing opportunities for management to engage in opportunistic behavior. Therefore, stronger CSR disclosure is associated with a lower propensity for earnings management. This finding is consistent with Hunjra et al. (2020), Kuo et al. (2021b), and Tran et al. (2022), who found that CSR negatively affects earnings management. These results indicate that socially responsible companies tend to maintain the quality of financial reporting and avoid earnings manipulation that could damage corporate reputation.

The test of the third hypothesis demonstrates that firm size has a positive and significant effect on earnings management. This finding indicates that larger firms tend to engage in earnings management more. This positive relationship may be attributed to the substantial pressure faced by large firms to maintain their image, financial performance, and market expectations. Firms with larger total assets generally receive greater attention from investors, creditors, regulators, and the public, creating pressure for management to demonstrate stable financial performance consistent with market expectations. Such pressure may encourage management to use certain accounting policies to maintain a positive perception of the firm. In addition, large firms typically have more complex operations than smaller firms, providing management with greater flexibility in accounting estimates and judgments that may be used to influence reported earnings (Lobo & Zhou, 2001; Evans et al., 2015). From an agency theory perspective, larger firms may face greater potential for agency conflicts because information asymmetry between management and shareholders increases. These conditions can create opportunities for opportunistic behavior, including earnings management, to maintain the firm's reputation and performance in the eyes of stakeholders. This finding is consistent with Habibie and Parasetya (2022) and Cinthya et al. (2022), who found that firm size positively influences earnings management. Thus, larger firms tend to exhibit a greater propensity for earnings management than smaller firms.

6. Conclusion

This study concludes that public ownership does not significantly affect earnings management, suggesting that public shareholders may not provide sufficiently strong monitoring to influence managerial reporting practices in SOEs. In contrast, CSR has a significant negative effect, suggesting that stronger CSR disclosure is associated with lower earnings management and can function as an accountability and transparency mechanism. Firm size has a significant positive effect, indicating that larger firms may face greater performance pressures and operational complexity that provide management with more opportunities to influence reported earnings. The F-test confirms that the three independent variables jointly have a significant effect on earnings management. However, the R-square of 0.210 indicates that the model explains only 21.0% of the variation. These findings imply that SOEs should strengthen CSR disclosure, financial reporting oversight, and internal governance to reduce opportunistic reporting practices and improve stakeholder confidence.

This study has several limitations. The analysis is limited to SOEs listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2020–2023, which may restrict the generalizability of the findings to other companies or periods. In addition, earnings management is measured using the Modified Jones Model, which focuses on accrual-based practices and may not fully capture real earnings management. The regression model also indicates positive autocorrelation, suggesting that residuals may be correlated across observations and should therefore be considered when interpreting the regression estimates. Furthermore, the model includes only three explanatory variables, leaving other potential determinants unexplored. Future research should

extend the observation period, use broader samples, apply alternative estimation techniques to address autocorrelation, compare accrual-based and real earnings management measures, and examine additional determinants such as corporate governance, financial distress, leverage, profitability, and managerial characteristics to provide a more comprehensive understanding of earnings management.

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Ethical approval was obtained for this study. The manuscript represents original work and has not been previously published, nor is it under consideration by another journal.

Data Disclosure Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.



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